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Abstract
We consider a regulator providing deposit insurance to a bank with
private information about its investment portfolio. Following current
regulatory practices, we assume that the regulator does not commit to
audit and sanction after any risk report from the bank. We show that,
in absence of commitment, the socially optimal contract leads a high-
risk bank to misreport its risk with positive probability in most cases.
We also isolate cases when truthful risk report is optimal. We thus
establish that extraction of truthful risk information is not socially
optimal in most cases given current regulatory practices.
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1 Introduction
Accurate estimates of the risk exposure in the banking industry are critical to
regulators. This information allows not only to set precautionary measures
to protect the banking industry, but also at individual level to adjust for pre-
mia in return for services offered by the regulator such as deposit insurance.
However, banks are notoriously reluctant to disclose such information. For
instance, banks in financial distress have clear incentives to keep this infor-
mation private since detection may trigger regulatory intervention leading to
severe changes in financial strategies and possibly financial sanctions.
This adverse selection issue has been addressed by the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlement through the Basel Committee, in an attempt to standard-
ize methods to extract such risk information. Starting in 1999, the Fisher II
Working Group was mandated to address two issues: 1- the optimal design
of a standardized report of portfolio risk, and 2- the design of incentives to
extract truthful risk information (see B.I.S. (2004)).
In this paper, we argue that extraction of truthful risk information is not
socially optimal in most cases because current regulatory practices deliber-
ately avoid to commit to detect and sanction fraudulent reports. Even if
there are large discrepancies about enforcement of regulatory decisions and
sanctions, most of them have in common that there is no commitment to
systematically detect and punish fraudulent risk reports.1 When misreports
are detected and interventions are decided, sanctions may vary, at the discre-
1As in Switzerland for instance, see the Confoederatio Helvetica (2004).
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tion of the regulator, from firing the CEO of a bank (typical in Germany), to
retiring the operating license or also seizing the bank profits for the current
exercise.
Absence of commitment to sanctions can mostly be explained by two
factors. First, detection of misreport mostly comes from auditing,2 and the
auditing cost may be prohibitive to a regulator in charge of monitoring a
large banking industry. Second, such practices allow for more flexibility in
the treatment of a particular problem. As argued earlier, public intervention
may trigger an over-reaction from outside investors that is beneficial to no
party, and interventions are thus used with caution even when needed.
Nevertheless, we argue that such practices do not allow for extraction
of truthful risk report. We show that, in the case of a regulator providing
deposit insurance to a bank, this lack of commitment to sanctions designs
the incentives to misreport the risk. We establish that the socially optimal
contract between the regulator and the bank induces a high-risk bank to lie
with strictly positive probability in most cases.
In more details, we address the above issues in the context of a regulator
providing deposit insurance to a bank. We model current practices where a
regulator sets capital requirements and deposit level, and commits to retire
the operating licence from the bank if such requirements are not met. The
bank reinvests part of the proceeds into risky loans, whose risk level is private
information to the bank. The regulator requires a report about the risk level,
and sets an insurance premium to cover for deposit insurance.
2Internal denunciation is also seen in practice.
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Then, without prior commitment and after receiving the report, the reg-
ulator may decide to audit at a fixed cost. An audit reveals the actual risk
taken by bank, and in case of misreport we assume that the regulator seizes
control of the bank profits. The bank seeks to maximize the initial value of
its shares, whereas the regulator seeks to maximize social welfare that in-
cludes the market value of the bank less the social cost of financial distress.
We thus follow the lines of Chan et al. (1992) to model the social role of a
regulator.
We first show that the optimal contract can be implemented through
a direct mechanism, answering the question of the optimal design of risk
report. Since in absence of commitment to audit, the Revelation Principle
as in Myerson (1979) does not apply, we use a recent method developed in
Belster and Strausz (2001) to derive this result. In contrast to the Revelation
Principle, absence of commitment to audit does not guarantee that truth-
telling is optimal.3 However, if the regulator commits to audit then a truth-
telling mechanism will be optimal, as shown in Giammarino et al. (1993).
In absence of commitment, we show that two cases can occur at the
socially optimal contract. If the auditing cost is too high, then audit does
not occur and the regulator prefers to implement truthful report through an
incentive compatible mechanism. Otherwise, an audit occurs with positive
probability albeit never surely, triggering the following optimal reaction from
the bank: with a high risk portfolio a bank systematically misreports, but a
bank with low risk portfolio always reveals it truthfully.
3This issue was also raised in a different setting by Persons (1997).
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The intuition of this result is as follows. First, at the optimal contract the
insurance premium is higher for a high-risk bank. Thus, a low risk bank has
no reason to misreport since its situation matches exactly the objective of
the regulator to reduce the social cost of financial distress, and the insurance
premium is minimal. However, when audit does not occur for sure, a high
risk bank has no reason to always report truthfully. Indeed, in this case,
such information would be exploited by the regulator and the bank would be
systematically charged a high premium. By randomizing the message about
its risk, and hence lying with strictly positive probability, the expected payoff
to the bank is strictly higher.
Finally, we show that a bank cannot extract any informational rent when
audit occurs with strictly positive probability. Still, the optimal contract
without commitment does not achieve the first-best.
Overall, our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the optimal risk
report reduces to direct revelation. There is thus no need to design devices
such as self-contradictory reports where a bank cannot misreport without
revealing accounting anomalies. Second, we show that partial commitment in
regulatory practices designs the incentives for risky banks to misreport. At a
theoretical level, we thus establish that extraction of truthful risk information
is not compatible with the objective of maximizing social welfare.
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2 The model
In this section, a formal description of the model is given. The basic model
closely follows the lines of Giammarino et al. (1993). A regulator providing
deposit insurance to a bank seeks to extract risk information on the bank
investment portfolio to set the insurance premium. The key feature of our
environment, and main departure from Giammarino et al., is that the reg-
ulator does not commit to audit and possible resulting sanctions in case of
risk misreport from the bank.
2.1 The interactions
We first describe the agents and the timing of the interactions. The strategy
sets and equilibrium concepts will be defined later. There are three periods
and two agents, a bank and a regulator, living during these three periods.
There is also an arbitrary number of investors who are risk-averse in banking
operations. We assume that investors are indifferent in every period between
illiquid securities offering a rate of return Re > 1 and liquid asset offering a
rate of return of 1 (this assumption is justified in Giammarino et al. (1993)).
In the first period 0, the regulator offers to the bank a menu specifying
a maximum level of deposits D, a maximum level of equities to be raised E,
a maximum investment level in risk-free asset B and a maximum number of
risky loans L that the bank is allowed to issue. If the bank stays within those
limits, a license to operate is granted by the regulator and a premium P to
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cover for deposit insurance is charged to the bank. The risk premium P as
well as the menu offered to the bank depend on risk level contained in the
bank risky loans portfolio, which is reported by the bank as described next.
In period 0, the bank has one outstanding share and a monopoly access
to a risky loans market. To make sure that a license (or right to operate)
is granted by the regulator, and given a menu (D,E,L,B, P ) offered by the
regulator, the bank proceeds as follows. First, the bank issues D deposits
and sell a fraction of equities E to new shareholders. With the proceeds, the
bank invests B in risk-free assets, with net return normalized to be 0.
The bank also invests a portion L of the proceeds in risky loans. The cost
of processing loans is assumed to be zero to simplify matters. The return
on loans is a random variable rq that depends on a variable q, representing
the quality of the bank loans market. Formally, rq has support [r, r] (with
r > r > 0) with distribution function G(r | q) depending on the quality of
the loans market q. We assume that, for the same given mean, an increase in
q leads to an increase in variance of the loans market (in the sense of Second-
Order Stochastic Dominance). In other words, we assume that if q > q′ then
rq is a mean-preserving spread of rq′ .
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The loans market has a quality q ∈ Q ≡ {qh, ql}, where qh represents a
high risk and ql a low risk (qh > ql). The quality is known to the bank in
period 0 when choosing a menu, for instance through superior information
about customers due to local interactions. The bank cannot influence the
4Formally, we assume that there exists a random variable ε with 0-mean such that
rq = rq′ + ε.
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quality of the market, but access to a low risk market carries a cost κ > 0.
Alternatively, we could have obtained the same qualitative results by
assuming instead that the bank can improve the quality through customers
screening, with investment in screening or cost being private information.
We avoid this issue to simplify the analysis, the basic insight being the same.
The quality of loans market, also refereed to as the portfolio quality of
the bank, is the type of the bank. The regulator does not know the quality
of the bank portfolio in this period.
In period 0, the bank is required to report some information about q in
the form a message chosen from an arbitrary message setM . We assume that
M is a metric space and we denote by M the Borel σ-algebra on M . Since
the menu (D,E,L,B, P ) offered by the regulator is tied to the message,
the bank implicitly chooses the menu when sending the message. All the
actions taken by the bank and the regulator are simultaneous in period 0.
This assumption captures the idea that the regulator commits to her action
during this period.
The regulator has a prior belief about the portfolio quality, in the form of
a probability distribution (γh, γl) such that γi > 0 for every i and
∑
i γi = 1.
The number γi is the anticipated probability that the quality is qi.
In period 1, the regulator audits the bank with probability α ∈ [0, 1], at
fixed cost c > 0. When auditing, the regulator knows with certainty the true
quality of the bank portfolio. This assumption simplifies the analysis, see for
instance Flannery (1991) and Lucas and McDonald (1987) for cases where
unobservable quality components play a significant role.
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The regulator expects that a type-i bank sends a report in Mi (i = l, h),
whereMi is a closed Borel set of strictly positive measure such thatMh∩Ml =
∅ and Mh ∪Ml = M . Throughout, we use the convention that, for every i,
the setM−i denotes the complementary ofMi inM . If the result of the audit
does not match the report expected from the bank; i.e., if a type i bank has
reported a message in M−i, the regulator seizes control of the bank profits.
Such a harsh penalty for misreporting the risk is rarely seen in practice,
although possible. This penalty level makes our point even stronger, since
as shown later even with such a harsh punishment a high-risk bank will
misreport at the optimal contract.
In the last period 2, cash flows are realized and redistributed to claimants.
Define the fraction of equities financing as z = E
D+E
. Two cases can occur:
• If the cash flow is greater or equal than D, the bank is solvent and
makes the following payments:
- the amount D is paid back to depositors,
- the residual is paid to the shareholders as dividends, with the fraction
1 − z paid to the initial shareholders and the remainder going to new
shareholders.
• If the cash flow is strictly less than D, the bank is declared bankrupt
and the regulator seizes control of the bank and all of its assets. The
regulator pays D to the depositors, and the shareholders loose all of
their claims.
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2.2 Definition of equilibrium
We next describe the strategies for the agents, and the equilibrium concepts
used to analyze our game.
First, a strategy for the regulator is a level of deposit D the bank can
issue, a level of equity financing E, a risk-free reserve B the bank must hold,
an amount of loans L the bank can issue, an insurance premium P charged to
the bank for deposit insurance and finally a probability of auditing α. If the
bank exceeds any of the quantities specified in (D,E,L,B), the license is not
granted. We denote the strategy quantities for the regulator (D,E,L,B, P )
by the letter x.
The regulator ties the menu (D,E,L,B, P ) to the report received from
the bank. Formally, the regulator commits to a menu x(m) if the received
report is m ∈ M , but the probability of auditing is chosen after reception
without prior commitment. From now on, we represent the choices of x and
α as measurable functions mapping the message space M into the positive
real line.
In a first step, we assume that the bank chooses its deposit level, equity
raised and loans issued to match exactly the prescription of the regulator so
that a license is granted. We will show later that this assumption is consistent
with equilibrium behavior. Thus, the action of the bank can be reduced to
a choice of message.
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Formally, a strategy for the bank is a report τ ∈ M to be sent to the
regulator about the riskiness of its portfolio. Since the bank can choose to
randomize among the reports sent, we represent a message strategy as a
measurable function m : Q→ P, where P is the set of probability measures
over M. For any given message strategy m, we define m =∑i γimi.5
The bank is constrained in two ways: equity constraint and cash flow
constraint. First, the equity constraint must ensure that investors are indif-
ferent between investing in the securities market and purchasing shares of
the bank. Formally, for a given quality qi, together with a portfolio (L,B)
and deposits D, the equity raised must be such that
ERe = z
∫ r
Rb
U [rL+B −D] dG(r | qi), (1)
where Rb = D−B
L
is the break even point below which the bank is bankrupt,
and where U is a positive, continuous, increasing and concave function rep-
resenting the investors’ risk aversion in banking operations. The left-hand
side of (1) is the expected return on the equities market, and the right-hand
side is the expected utility to new shareholders of banking operations.6
Moreover, the bank investment decision must also satisfy the cash flow
constraint
D + E = B + L+ P. (2)
5It is straightforward to check that m ∈ P.
6The premium for deposit insurance is paid by the initial shareholders.
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The left-hand side of (2) represents the proceeds from deposits and equity
raising, and the right-hand side are the investments and payment made by
the bank. As justified in Giammarino et al. (1993), we assume without loss
of generality that D = L. Intuitively, this assumption stipulates that equity
financing is used only to cover for the default probability.
The bank seeks to maximize the value to initial shareholders prior to the
equities issuance, taking into account their risk aversion in banking opera-
tions. For a given strategy x and in absence of audit (i.e., α = 0), the initial
value of the bank with type qi and sending a report τ ∈M is
pii(x, τ |M) = (1−z)
∫ r
Rb
U [rL(τ) +B(τ)−D(τ)] dG(r | qi)−P (τ)−κi, (3)
where κl = κ and κh = 0.
Plugging (1) into (3), and together with our previous assumptions, the
initial value to initial shareholders without audit rewrites as
pii(x, τ |M) =
∫ r
Rb
U [(r − 1)L(τ) +B(τ)] dG(r | qi) (4)
− Re[B(τ) + P (τ)]− κi.
If audits occurs with probability α > 0, and when using the message
strategy m, the expected payoff to a bank of type qi rewrites as
Πi(x, α,m |M) (5)
≡
∫
Mi
pii(x, τ |M)dmi(τ)
+
∫
M−i
[(1− α(τ))pii(x, τ |M)− α(τ)pii(x, τ |M)]dmi(τ).
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The first term in the right-hand side of (5) is the expected payoff to the
bank when reporting truthfully, and the second term is the expected payoff
in case of misreporting and possible detection by the regulator.
Given a strategy form the regulator, the bank chooses a message strategy
to maximize the value (5) subject to the cash flow constraint (2).7
We next turn to describing the objective of the regulator. The regulator
aims to provide deposit insurance while maximizing social welfare. The social
welfare reflects bank profits less involvement cost in banking regulation and
social cost of financial distress.
For a given strategy x chosen by the regulator, the social cost of financial
distress from a bank with portfolio quality qi and sending the report τ is
measured by
Fi(x, τ |M) ≡ −
∫ Rb
r
U [(r − 1)L(τ) +B(τ)] dG(r | qi). (6)
Thus, the social cost of financial distress is the expected payoff in case of
bankruptcy. Because of risk-aversion in banking operations, we can notice
that Second-Order Stochastic Dominance implies that
Fl(x, τ |M) ≤ Fh(x, τ |M), (7)
for every (x, τ ,M) (see Mas-Colell et al. (1995) Section 6.D for a detailed
explanation). In words, Second-Order Stochastic Dominance together with
risk-aversion implies that, for any given menu, a low-risk bank has a lower
cost of financial distress than a high-risk bank.
7Notice that the equity financing constraint is already embedded in (5).
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The net expected payoff from providing deposit insurance to a bank with
portfolio quality qi and sending the report τ ∈M is
Si(x, τ |M) ≡ P (τ) + Fi(x, τ |M). (8)
The above embodies the premium payment from the bank and the social
cost of financial distress. The regulator objective also encompasses the net
profit to the bank less any penalty resulting from an audit. For sake of
simplicity, we assume that there is no social cost of involvement in the deposit
insurance program.8
The overall payoff to the regulator from a quantity strategy x without
audit (i.e., α = 0), after receiving a report τ from a type i bank, can then
be described by the welfare function
Wi(x, τ |M) = Si(x, τ |M) + pii(x, τ |M). (9)
After receiving a report τ from the bank, the regulator posterior belief
about the portfolio random quality is represented by the measurable mapping
p :M → ∆, where ∆ ≡ {p ∈ R2+ |
∑
i pi = 1} is the simplex on R2. In words,
the principal believes that the portfolio has quality qi with probability pi(τ)
when receiving the report τ . We require that the regulator posterior beliefs
be consistent with Bayes’ rule on the support of the message strategy m
chosen by the bank. Formally, we require that for every i and every O ∈M
such that m(O) > 0, the following relation holds∫
O
pidm = γimi(O). (10)
8According to Ballard et al. (1985), the social cost in practice is estimated at 1+λ per
dollar invested, where the range of λ is (.17, .56).
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Thus, the overall expected payoff to the regulator, when facing a message
strategym and when auditing with probability α(τ) after receiving the report
τ in the support of m, rewrites as
W (x, α,m |M) (11)
≡
∑
i
∫
M
pi(τ)Wi(x, τ |M)dmi(τ)
+
∑
i
∫
M
pi(τ)αi(τ) ·
[
pi−i(x, τ)
∫
M
pi(τ)dm(τ)− c
]
dmi(τ).
In the above, the first term on the right-hand side is the expected payoff
from providing deposit insurance, and the second term is the expected payoff
from auditing operations.
We next describe our equilibrium concept. We need to capture the idea
that the regulator commits first to a menu (D(.), E(.), L(.), B(.), P (.)) as a
function of the received report, and then sets the probability of auditing. We
will see later the implication of this timing in terms of optimal contract.
Definition 1 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, given the message set M , is
a strategy for the regulator (x, α), a strategy for the bank m and a belief
function p such that
1. given m and x, the auditing probability α maximizes (11),
2. given x, the message strategy mi maximizes (5) for every i, and
3. the belief function p satisfies (10) given the message strategy m.
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We focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria that minimize the social cost of
financial distress (6) while leaving the bank profit constant; i.e, we focus
on equilibria (x, α,m, p,M) such that there is no other perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (x′, α′,m′, p′,M) satisfying
• W (x′, α′,m′ |M) > W (x, α,m |M), and
• Πi(x′, α′,m′ |M) = Πi(x, α,m |M) for every i.
We call any such equilibrium incentive efficient.
We add to the regulator problem the participation constraint for the bank.
In our setting, it comes down to making sure that the bank can generate
positive profits; i.e., we require that for every i,
Πi(x, α,m |M) ≥ 0. (12)
Finally, we say that two perfect Bayesian equilibria (x, α,m, p,M) and
(x′, α′,m′, p′,M ′) are payoff-equivalent if Πi(x′, α′m′ |M ′) = Πi(x, α,m |M)
for every i and W (x′, α′,m′ |M ′) =W (x, α,m |M).
3 Optimal message space
In this section, we show that any incentive-efficient equilibrium is payoff-
equivalent to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for a message space reduced
to Q, the set of possible portfolio random realizations. In our setting, the
absence of full commitment from the regulator does not allow for a direct use
of the Revelation Principle (see Myerson (1979)), but we rely on the method
described in Belster and Strausz (2001) to derive this result.
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Proposition 2 Let (x, α,m, p,M) be incentive-efficient. There exists a per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium (xˆ, αˆ, mˆ, pˆ, Q) with mˆi(qi) > 0 for every i, which is
payoff-equivalent to (x, α,m, p,M). Moreover, in the equilibrium (xˆ, αˆ, mˆ, pˆ, Q),
the penalty is imposed by the regulator if the bank is audited and has not
truthfully reported its type.
The previous result allows us to simplify the task of finding the socially
optimal contract. We can now narrow our search of the optimal contract to
a direct mechanism inducing individual rationality and incentive compatibil-
ity, together with period 1 optimal decisions for both agents as additional
constraints. Nevertheless, the constraint for period 1 optimal decisions does
not allow for truth-telling. We will analyze later which bank type has an
incentive to lie at the optimal contract.
To solve for the optimal contract, we first reduce the above program and
it can be verified later that the solution to the reduced program satisfies all
of the above constraints.9 For purely technical reasons, we assume that κ is
large enough so as to offset any gain from risk aversion. The reduced program
is such that the regulator never audits when the bank reports a high risk,
and the low-risk bank always reports truthfully. The basic intuition for this
simplification is that a high-risk bank is charged a higher premium at the
optimal contact, and thus has incentives to hide its risk to reduce payments
to the regulator. For the same reasons, a low-risk bank has is in the best
situation and has no incentive to misreport.
9This approach is similar to that in Khalil (1997).
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Slightly abusing notations, we denote by α = αl the probability of au-
diting when the type is low, and by m = mh(l) the probability that a high
type bank lies in its report. From the principal’ viewpoint, we thus have
that ph = (1−m)γh and pl = γl +mγh, and also pl|h = mγhmγh+γl . To simplify
notations, we denote by pii(xj) the profit pii(xj, j) (i, j = h, l).
The reduced program, denoted by S, rewrites as
Max phWh(xh, h) + pl
[
Wl(xl, l) + α(pl|hpih(xl)− c)
]
(13)
subject to
pil(xl) ≥ 0, (14)
(1−m)pih(xh) +m[(1− α)pih(xl)− αpih(xl)] ≥ 0, (15)
m ∈ Argmax
m′
(1−m′)pih(xh) +m′[(1− α)pih(xl)− αpih(xl)], (16)
α ∈ Argmax
α′
α′[pl|h · pih(xl)− c]. (17)
The conditions (14)-(15) represent the individual rationality constraints
for both types, condition (16) represents the incentive compatibility con-
straint for the high type, and condition (17) is period 1 optimal auditing
decision.
4 Optimal contract
We now study the properties of the optimal contract. Depending on the
parameters of the program S, it may be optimal for the regulator not to
audit (i.e., α = 0). We study the cases α = 0 and α > 0 separately.
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4.1 The no-audit contract
We now analyze the case where α = 0 at the solution to S. From Condition
(17) in the reduced program, this case typically occurs when the cost of
auditing is too high. When such a situation is anticipated by the bank, we
know from the Revelation Principle that it is optimal for the regulator to
offer a contract inducing truthful reports for both types.
The constraint on individual rationality for the low-risk bank (15) rewrites
as
pih(xh) ≥ 0. (18)
The Incentive Compatibility Constraint (16) to induce truthful report for a
high-risk bank rewrites as
pih(xh) ≥ pih(xl). (19)
Moreover, since truth-telling is induced, one can simply ignore the auditing
constraint (17). Let (xnl , x
n
h) denote the optimal no-audit contract, and let
(x∗l , x
∗
h) denote the first-best allocation. A standard analysis shows that the
optimal no-audit contract satisfies
pih(x
n
h) = pih(x
n
l ), pil(x
n
l ) = 0 and x
n
h = x
∗
h. (20)
The optimal non-audit contract induces an informational rent for a high-
type bank, whereas all the surplus is extracted from a low-type bank. More-
over, the high-type optimal level is at the first-best level, and the low-type
optimal level is strictly less than the first-best to compensate for the infor-
mational rent.
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4.2 The audit contract
We now consider the case when it is optimal for the regulator to threaten
audit with strictly positive probability. We first start by analyzing the possi-
bility of misreport at the optimal auditing contract. The proof to this result
is inspired from Khalil (1997).
Proposition 3 At the optimal auditing contract, we have that α < 1 and
0 < m < 1.
Proposition 3 says that, at the optimal contract where auditing is optimal,
the regulator always randomizes audit decision and the high type bank lies
with strictly positive probability.
Since it is necessary to randomize auditing and misreporting at the opti-
mal auditing contract, constraints (16) and (17) can be rewritten as
pih(xh) = (1− α)pih(xl)− αpih(xl), (21)
pih(xl)pl|h = c. (22)
From equation (21), we also have that the optimal auditing decision, as
a function of the optimal contract values, is given by
α ≡ pih(xl)− pih(xh)
2pih(xl)
. (23)
Also, equation (22) implies that the equilibrium probability of misreport-
ing is endogenously given by
m¯ ≡ γl
γh
c
c+ pih(xl)
. (24)
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Therefore, we can use the optimal values found in (24) and (23) to rewrite
the regulator problem as
Max (1− m¯)γhWh(xh, h) (25)
+(γl + m¯γh)
[
Wl(xl, l) + α
(
m¯γh
m¯γh + γl
pih(xl)− c
)]
subject to
pil(xl) ≥ 0, (26)
pih(xh) ≥ 0. (27)
It is straightforward to check that, at the solution to the above program,
the constraints (26) and (27) must bind. We have thus established the fol-
lowing result.
Proposition 4 At the optimal contract, the bank cannot extract any infor-
mational rent.
This result contrasts the well-known results in Contract Theory (or also
as shown in Section III.A) with commitment to audit, where a high risk bank
would systematically extract some surplus from the information asymmetry.
The program of maximizing (25) subject to (26) and (27) can now be
easily solved by numerical methods to pinpoint the optimal values of capital
requirements and insurance premium.
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5 Conclusion
Overall, our work investigates from a theoretical standpoint some questions
of banking regulation regarding private risk information. Mostly, we argue
that current practices do not allow for an accurate estimate of the risk level in
the banking industry, because of lack of commitment to detect and sanction
fraudulent reports. Given such practices, we establish that, at the optimal
contract, a regulator must tolerate that a high-risk bank misreports.
The practical difficulties to extract accurate risk information are already
and implicitly acknowledged in some surveys issued by Bank for International
Settlements, for instance in (2003). The point of our study is to show that
such difficulties stem from absence of commitment to audit. If other words,
we argue that if the objective of a regulator is to obtain an accurate esti-
mate of the risk level in the banking industry, then there must be a political
commitment to detect and to sanction fraudulent reports. This implies to
change current regulatory practices by adding clear-cut sanctions in case of
detection, and to invest enough funds to carry out large auditing campaigns.
Our study also calls for some empirical testing. In particular, a predic-
tion of our work is that the intensity of an auditing campaign (in terms of
funds invested) should be negatively correlated with the relative percentage
of fraudulent reports. Similarly, one should expect a similar relationship be-
tween the number of regulatory interventions and this same percentage. It
would also be of interest to know whether there is a correlation between the
aggregate risk in financial markets and the percentage of fraudulent reports.
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A Appendix
In this Appendix, we prove the results stated earlier.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
This result is derived from a slight modification of the proof of Proposition
2 in Belster and Strausz (2001). We first state an intermediate result, which
is Proposition 1 in this last reference.
Lemma 5 Let (x, α,m, p,M) be incentive efficient. There exists a Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (x, α,m′, p,M) and a set M ′, with |M ′| ≤ |Q| and
m′(M ′) = 1, such that (x, α,m′, p,M) and (x, α,m, p,M) are payoff equiva-
lent. Moreover, the vectors (m′i(τ))i∈Q,τ∈M ′ are linearly independent.
With the above lemma, we can now prove Proposition 2. Consider any
incentive efficient equilibrium (x, α,m, p,M) together with the corresponding
couple (m′,M ′) given by Lemma 5. Since the vectors (m′i(τ))i∈Q,τ∈M ′ are
linearly independent, one can always find a partition of closed non-empty
sets (M ′l ,M
′
h) of M
′ such that a type i bank lies when sending a message in
M ′−i. Therefore, by simply deleting any message set H such that m
′(H) = 0,
Lemma 5 and our previous remark directly imply that there exists a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (x′, α′,m′, p′,M ′) withM ′ =M ′l ∪M ′h, which is payoff-
equivalent to (x, α,m, p,M).
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Consider now the correspondence S : M ′ → Q defined for every τ ∈ M ′
as S(τ) = {qi | m′i(τ) > 0}. A direct application of the Marriage Theorem
(see Weyl (1949) for the statement and Belster and Strausz (2001) for the
details of the application) shows that there exists a mapping ξ : Q → M ′
such that 1) m′i(ξ(qi)) > 0 for every i, and 2) for every τ ∈ M ′ there exists
q ∈ Q satisfying ξ(q) = τ . For any τ ∈ M ′, we define the non-empty set
Ω(τ) ≡ {q | τ = ξ(q)}.
We are now in position to find the direct mechanism that is payoff-
equivalent to our original incentive efficient equilibrium. We next define
our candidate equilibrium (xˆ, αˆ, mˆ, pˆ, Qˆ), with Qˆi = {qi} for every i. We set
for every i and j the variables
mˆi(qj) =
m′i(ξ(qj))
|Ω(ξ(qj))| , pˆi = p
′(ξ(qi)), xˆ(qi) = x′(ξ(qi)), αˆi = α′i(ξ(qi)), Qˆi = {qi}.
We next show that (xˆ, αˆ, mˆ, pˆ, Qˆ)is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that is
payoff-equivalent to (x′, α′,m′, p′,M ′). We first claim that mˆi is a probability
distribution over Q for every i. By construction, we have that
∑
j
mˆi(qj) =
∑
τ∈M ′
∑
qj∈Ω(τ)
m′i(τ)
|Ω(τ)| =
∑
τ∈M ′
m′i(τ) = 1,
proving the claim.
We next claim that the principal beliefs pˆ also satisfies Bayesian con-
sistency in the sense of (10). By construction, we have for every i and j
that
pˆi(qj) = p
′
i(ξ(qj)) =
γim
′
i(ξ(qj))∑
k γkm
′
k(ξ(qj))
=
γimˆi(qj)∑
k γkmˆk(qj)
.
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Thus, we have that (xˆ, αˆ, mˆ, pˆ, Qˆ) satisfies Condition 3 in Definition 1.
We next show that (xˆ, αˆ, mˆ, pˆ, Qˆ) and (x′, α′,m′, p′,M ′) generate the same
payoff to the bank. First, we notice that any allocation that a bank in-
duces with message q ∈ Q under (xˆ, αˆ, mˆ, pˆ, Qˆ) can also be induced by
the message ξ(q) ∈ M ′ under (x′, α′,m′, p′,M ′). Conversely, since for ev-
ery τ ∈ M ′ there exists q ∈ Q such that ξ(q) = τ , any allocation in-
duced under (x′, α′,m′, p′,M ′) by a message τ ∈ M ′ can also be induced
by the corresponding q under (xˆ, αˆ, mˆ, pˆ, Qˆ). We have thus shown that
Πi(x
′, α′,m′|M ′) = Πi(xˆ, αˆ, mˆ|Qˆ) for every i.
Moreover, by construction of the selection ξ we have that mˆi(q) > 0 if and
only if m′i(ξ(q)) > 0 for every i and q. Using this last remark, and together
with the payoff equivalence proved above, we have that any strategy m is
weakly dominated by mˆ under (xˆ, αˆ, mˆ, pˆ, Qˆ). Thus, we have shown that
Condition 2 in Definition 1 is satisfied by (xˆ, αˆ, mˆ, pˆ, Qˆ).
By the same argument as above, we can also show thatW (x′, α′,m′|M ′) =
W (xˆ, αˆ, mˆ|Qˆ) for every i, and also that (xˆ, αˆ, mˆ, pˆ, Qˆ) satisfies Condition 1
in Definition 1.
We have thus established that (xˆ, αˆ, mˆ, pˆ, Qˆ) is a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium, and that it is payoff-equivalent to (x′, α′,m′, p′,M ′).
By Lemma 5, it follows that (xˆ, αˆ, mˆ, pˆ, Qˆ) is also payoff-equivalent to
the incentive efficient (x, α,m, p,M). Since the sets Qˆi (i = 1, 2) correspond
to the reference sets upon which the regulator bases its decision to impose
penalty, the proof is now complete.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We now show that, when audit occurs at the optimal contract (i.e., α > 0),
the regulator never audits for sure and the high-risk bank assigns strictly
positive probability to every message.
We first show by way of contradiction that α < 1 at the optimal contract.
Assume not; i.e., assume that α = 1. By (17), it must be true that
mγh
mγh + γl
pih(xl) ≥ c > 0, (28)
which implies that m > 0. However, by (16), if α = 1 then it must be true
that m = 0. This is a contradiction, and thus α < 1.
We next show that 0 < m < 1. We first show that m > 0. Since we have
established that 0 < α < 1, we must have from (17) that
mγh
mγh + γl
pih(xl) = c, (29)
which directly implies that m > 0 since c is strictly positive.
We next show that m < 1 by way of contradiction. Assume that m = 1;
i.e., the high risk bank always misreports its type and the regulator offers a
low-risk menu to both types of bank. We next claim that the no-audit optimal
contract beats any feasible contract such that 1) menus are equal for both
types, 2) random audit occurs and 3) high-risk bank lies with probability 1.
Consider any such feasible contract. From (13), the highest payoff the
regulator can obtain from this contract is Wl(x
∗
l , l)+α(γhpih(x
∗
l )− c). More-
over, since such contract is feasible and since α > 0, it must be true that
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γhpih(x
∗
l ) = c. Thus the highest payoff to the regulator in this case is
Wl(x
∗
l , l).
However, such payoff can be attained by a feasible allocation in the no-
audit optimal contract in Section III.A. From the results in this section, we
know that the optimal no-audit contract is such that menus are different.
Thus the no-audit contract generates a strictly higher payoff than any con-
tract described above.
Since the truth-telling contract is feasible in the reduced program, the
regulator can do strictly better by offering this contract in which zero auditing
is involved. Thus, we must have that α = 0 is a best-response. This is a
contradiction, and we must have m < 1. The proof is now complete.
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